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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an exploration of whistleblowing as a protracted process, using secondary data 
from 868 cases from a whistleblower advice line in the UK. Previous research on whistleblowing has 
mainly studied this phenomenon as a one-off decision by someone perceiving wrongdoing within an 
organisation to raise a concern or to remain silent. Earlier suggestions that whistleblowing is a process 
and that people find themselves inadvertently turned into whistleblowers by management responses, 
has not been followed up by a systematic study tracking the path of how a concern is repeatedly raised 
by whistleblowers. This paper provides a quantitative exploration of whistleblowing as a protracted 
process, rather than a one-off decision. 
Our research finds that the whistleblowing process generally entails two or even three internal at-
tempts to raise a concern before an external attempt is made, if it is made at all. We also find that it 
is necessary to distinguish further between different internal (e.g. line manager, higher management, 
specialist channels) as well as external whistleblowing recipients (e.g. regulators, professional bodies, 
journalists). Our findings suggest that whistleblowing is a protracted process and that this process is 
internally more protracted than previously documented. The overall pattern is that whistleblowers 
tend to search for a more independent recipient at each successive attempt to raise their concern. 
Formal whistleblower power seems to determine which of the available recipients are perceived as 
viable, and also what the initial responses are in terms of retaliation and effectiveness. 
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Wim Vandekerckhove & Arron Phillips, University of Greenwich 
 
Introduction 
This paper uses secondary data from an independent whistleblower advice line in the UK - Public 
Concern at Work (PCAW) to explore whistleblowing as a protracted process. Previous whistleblow-
ing research has examined whistleblowing mainly as a one-off rational decision. The suggestion from 
Rothschild and Miethe (1999) that whistleblowing is a sequence of attempts someone makes to raise 
a concern, and that people find themselves to be inadvertently turned into whistleblowers by man-
agement responses, has not been followed up by a systematic field study tracking the path of how a 
concern is repeatedly raised by whistleblowers, and identifying patterns of responses and effective-
ness of each recipient along that path. We deem that to do so is crucial if research wants to inform 
the various actors that occupy themselves with making whistleblowing more successful - from the 
lawyers that represent whistleblowers or organisations, whistleblower support groups, unions, con-
flict mediators, HR departments, compliance and ethics officers, to regulators and legislators - about 
patterns in whistleblowing processes. All of these actors would benefit from insights into through 
what sequences or ‘routes’ whistleblowers tend to escalate their concern, which of these routes (rather 
than any single recipient) make whistleblowing more effective in stopping wrongdoing, and which 
of these routes are less harmful for whistleblowers. Thus, our exploration in this paper of whistle-
blowing as a protracted process proceeds via the following research questions: 
RQ1: If whistleblowing is a protracted process, what is the typical sequence of recipients? 
RQ2: At what point in the protracted process does whistleblowing become an effective way to 
stop wrongdoing? 
RQ3: How does retaliation change throughout the process? 
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We answer these research questions using a dataset of 1,000 whistleblower cases from the Public 
Concern at Work (PCAW) database. PCAW is an independent agency in the UK providing free ad-
vice to people who want to raise a concern about wrongdoing in their workplace. PCAW is not a 
regulator, nor does it operate corporate hotlines. PCAW does not investigate concerns. It advises 
individuals on how to best raise their concern inside or outside of their workplace whilst remaining 
within the protection boundaries of the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act.  
The contributions of this paper are twofold. The first is that our exploration of whistleblowing as a 
protracted process offers a more differentiated insight into the roles of those who receive whistle-
blower concerns. Rather than merely distinguishing internal from external whistleblowing, our re-
search design provides knowledge of how whistleblowing unfolds through a combination of different 
internal recipients, and takes into account the internal process preceding external whistleblowing. We 
also distinguish regulators - mandated as prescribed persons under the UK whistleblowing legislation 
- from other external recipients (professional bodies, NGOs). We find some indications that rather 
than merely reverting to external after internal whistleblowing, whistleblowers might very well be 
searching for a more independent recipient at each successive attempt to raise their concern. A second 
contribution of this paper is that our exploration offers support for theorising power at the institutional 
level rather than the individual or organisational level to explain whistleblowing outcomes. More 
precisely, our findings make it plausible to theorise that it might not be formal whistleblower power 
that determines one’s legitimacy and credibility, but rather that the formal power of the whistleblower 
influences which of the available recipients are perceived as viable. Our findings further suggest that 
both effective and safe whistleblowing might depend on the whistleblower’s ability to break the or-
ganisation’s control over the whistleblowing process. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first review the whistleblowing literature in terms of how 
whistleblowing is conceptualised: a one-off decision versus a process. We then proceed in the section 
after with developing hypotheses around our research questions, which structure our exploration. The 
section after that explains how we collected and analysed our data, and what the uniqueness as well 
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as the limitations of our data are. After that, we present our findings for each hypothesis. We then 
discuss these in a separate section, before concluding with a summary of our findings.  
 
One-off decision versus process 
In the early 1970s the term whistleblowing was coined as behaviour resulting from a moral choice, 
more precisely as 
an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the 
organization he serves, blow the whistle that the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, 
fraudulent or harmful activity (Nader et al, 1972: vii). 
This definition presents whistleblowing as a cognitive, one-off ethical decision. Research into whis-
tleblowing from an organisational behaviour perspective from the 1980s onwards not only maintained 
whistleblowing as a prosocial phenomenon, but also sustained the assumptions of whistleblowing as 
a cognitive and one-off decision (Jones et al, 2014; Watts and Buckley, 2015). The standard definition 
of whistleblowing today (Brown et al, 2014) is the prosocial definition of Near and Miceli (1985: 4) 
‘the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate prac-
tices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect ac-
tion’. Dozier and Miceli (1985) constructed a Prosocial Organisational Behaviour (POB) model that 
depicts whistleblowing as involving both egoistic and altruistic motives. Moreover, the POB model 
postulates that whistleblowing behaviour is determined by interactions of stable personality charac-
teristics and individuals’ perceptions of organisational situations. Dozier and Miceli (1985) see the 
whistleblowing decision process as a cognitive process consisting of the following steps (Jones et al, 
2014): 1) awareness that an act is questionable, 2) decision to react, and 3) deciding what action to 
take. Miceli and Near (1992) added a fourth step:  organisation members react to the whistleblowing 
(often against the whistleblower). This begs the question to what extent the anticipated consequences 
people take into account when making the assumed cost-benefit decision whether or not to blow the 
5 
whistle, match the actual responses from organisational members. However, this research question 
has had very little resonance amongst whistleblowing scholars. 
Since 2000, whistleblowing research suggests the whistleblowing decision-making process might not 
be all that rational or cognitive as previously assumed. Gundlach et al (2003) and Blenkinsopp and 
Edwards (2008) argued the decision is to a great extent influenced by emotional responses. Once 
made, the decision nevertheless becomes cognitive through information processing and rationalisa-
tion (Blenkinsopp and Edwards, 2008; Gundlach et al, 2003; MacGregor and Steubs, 2014). Mac-
Gregor and Steubs (2014) built a decision-making model for what they term ‘fallacious silence’, a 
situation in which individuals refrain from raising a concern about illegal or immoral issues that vio-
late personal, moral or legal standards. Their model consists of a triangle of determinants including 
incentives, opportunities, and rationalisation possibilities. Whilst this model does not necessarily re-
gard the decision to blow the whistle or remain silent as a cognitive process - rationalisation allows 
for post hoc cognitive justification of a predetermined decision - it still assumes that to blow the 
whistle or to remain silent is a one-off decision. 
Whistleblowing research has also advanced by focusing on who whistleblowers raise their concern 
with. Near and Miceli’s (1985: 4) definition leaves this quite open: ‘to persons or organizations that 
may be able to effect action’. Research into whistleblowing recipients has predominantly used an 
internal/external dichotomy with little or no differentiation within these categories. Internal whistle-
blowing entails raising a concern about alleged wrongdoing to an authority within the organisation. 
External whistleblowing involves raising a concern to an outside agency, such as a professional or-
ganisation, a regulator, or the media. Sims and Keenan (1998) found external whistleblowing to be 
predicted by perceived supervisor support, perceived informal policies, and ideal values about whis-
tleblowing. Here again, whistleblowing is casted as a decision to do it either internally or externally, 
without considering the possibility of doing one after the other. Kaptein (2011) measured the impact 
of organisational culture on how people raise a concern about wrongdoing, differentiating between 
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inaction, confronting the wrongdoer, reporting to management, calling an internal hotline, and exter-
nal whistleblowing. This study does not include a measurement of how people continue to raise the 
concern – e.g. does organisational culture influence how one would raise a concern after confronting 
the wrongdoer, or after reporting to management? No doubt culture is important to the whistleblowing 
process but the data used for the analysis in this paper does not allow to address the role of culture. 
Hence we do not elaborate on organisational culture in this paper. 
Vandekerckhove et al (2014) define successful whistleblowing as whistleblowing that is both effec-
tive in stopping the wrongdoing and safe for the whistleblower. Effectiveness of whistleblowing is 
the  
extent to which the questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least partly 
because of whistleblowing and within a reasonable time frame. (Near and Miceli, 1995: 681)  
Indeed, if the primary motivation of raising a concern is to effect a change in practice, then the impact 
of raising the concern on the perceived wrongdoing needs to be separated from responses to the whis-
tleblower. Nevertheless, Near and Miceli’s (1995) proposition is that whistleblowing will be more 
effective if the concern is raised with a powerful recipient, but only if that recipient is supportive of 
the whistleblower. They do not formulate the proposition in terms of internal versus external recipi-
ents. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) noted a small negative correlation between whistle-
blowing and effectiveness. However, all cases in the sample were external whistleblowing. In con-
trast, Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found external whistleblowers to be more effective in triggering 
investigations and remedial actions. They analysed 33 legal cases of employees fired for whistle-
blowing, looking for patterns of internal or external whistleblowing that might determine effective-
ness of the whistleblowing and retaliation against the whistleblower. They found that internal whis-
tleblowers were usually ineffective in stopping the wrongdoing, partly because they ‘seem to poorly 
select their complaint recipient’ (Dworkin and Bacaus, 1998: 1295) with most of them raising the 
concern directly with managers involved in the wrongdoing. External whistleblowers tended to be 
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more effective in triggering investigations and remedial actions. In terms of retaliation, internal whis-
tleblowers tended to be dismissed immediately, while external whistleblowers were dismissed after 
a while. Interestingly the sample used by Dworkin and Bacaus (1998) also included a number of cases 
where whistleblowers had gone external only after first raising their concern internally. However, 
while Dworkin and Bacaus (1998) insist that ‘[we] limit our understanding of whistleblowing if we 
continue to treat internal and external whistleblowers as one group’ (p. 1296), their analysis does not 
acknowledge that the complexity of the whistleblowing process might be even greater when it is 
protracted, i.e. whistleblowers go external after raising their concern internally. Nevertheless, 
Dworkin and Bacaus (1998) called for future research to identify patterns of retaliation and effective-
ness in relation to specific internal and external recipients of whistleblowing. This paper provides 
such an analysis. 
Smith (2014) argues that ‘we do not know which types of retaliation and suffering will prove more 
or less important for whistleblowers in different circumstances’ (p. 236). This was already acknowl-
edged in early whistleblowing research (Miceli and Near, 1989; Near and Miceli, 1986), and the 
standard solution has been to give all types of retaliation the same weight and add these up along with 
factors capturing the breadth of retaliation such as number of types of retaliation and number of types 
of organisation members involved in the retaliation (Miceli et al, 2008). Smith (2014) comments that 
the effect of this solution to the objective/subjective suffering ‘has been to help direct attention away 
from analysis of specific types of whistleblower suffering’ (p. 236). Hence, if the aim is to gain insight 
into specific types of retaliation and patterns of protracted retaliation, we should avoid aggregating 
different types of retaliation into a single index. Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found that internal and 
external whistleblowers differed in the type of retaliation they experienced. Internal whistleblowers 
tended to be dismissed more quickly that external whistleblowers. 
To our knowledge, only five studies of protracted whistleblowing exist. Rothschild and Miethe (1999) 
interviewed more than 200 whistleblowers in the US. They find that ‘[many] came to their whistle-
blowing almost by accident’ (Rothschild and Miethe, 1999: 119). Employees raised their concern to 
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their line manager and then to senior management, each time believing the recipient would step in to 
correct the situation. Only after voicing their concern internally twice did they consider going to 
authorities outside the organisation. Whistleblowers almost never accurately anticipated the conse-
quences of voicing their concern. Nevertheless, one of the most important findings of their research 
is that  
[it] is management’s response that shapes the potential whistle-blower’s subsequent actions. 
Specifically, our interviews revealed a common pattern in which management’s efforts to dis-
credit or retaliate against the claimant become the major catalyst for the political transformation 
of the concerned employee into a “persistent resister” (Rothschild and Miethe, 1999: 119-120).  
The implication is that if whistleblowers make a cost-benefit decision prior to voicing a concern, they 
are bound to make that decision on mistaken terms. Moreover, they appear to be unaware that the 
decision they make is a whistleblowing decision. Rather, they voice their concern inadvertently, not 
knowing that what they do is whistleblowing. With regard to the ethicality of whistleblowing deci-
sions or the post hoc rationalisations suggested in the literature, Rothschild and Miethe (1999: 120) 
write that 
[it] is by virtue of the organization’s retaliatory response that whistle-blowers become con-
vinced of the moral correctness of their actions and strengthened in their conviction to fight—
both to exonerate themselves and to correct the organization’s wrong. 
Donkin et al (2008) used data from two surveys of Australian public sector workers in an attempt to 
track reporting paths. Unfortunately, the two surveys differed in the way they captured the sequence 
of reporting. One survey asked respondents to indicate with whom they raised their concern the first 
time, second time, etc. The other survey asked respondents to indicate with whom they raised first, 
and list all subsequent recipients without indicating the sequence. Findings show that 97% of whis-
tleblowing starts as voicing a concern internally, and 90% remains internal. It is also clear that line 
managers and senior management are generally the first two ports of call, with the number of whis-
tleblowing attempts averaging at 1.9 and 4.3 in the respective surveys (Donkin et al, 2008). It is 
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possible that the research design did not anticipate finding whistleblowing to be so heavily protracted, 
and the research report is not able to show clear figures for each recipient linked with specific re-
sponse patterns or their effectiveness as whistleblowing channel. Mansbach and Bachner (2010) use 
an experimental research design with vignettes to measure Israeli nurses’ willingness to raise a con-
cern about possible harm to patients as a protracted process. They differentiated internal recipients 
into ‘wrongdoer’ and ‘a central ethics committee’. External recipients were ‘a professional body’ and 
the press. Participants expressed a higher likelihood to raise a concern internally than externally, and 
their willingness decreased at each step of escalation. Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) researched whis-
tleblowing in the Norwegian public sector, and distinguish between weak, strong internal, and strong 
external whistleblowing. The notion of strong whistleblowing puts an emphasis on process, as 
Skivenes and Trygstad define it as  
where there is no improvement in, explanation for, or clarification of the reported misconduct 
from those who can do something about it. In such cases, an employee must report the miscon-
duct again and is thus engaging in strong whistleblowing. (p. 1077) 
The study found that 36% engaged in strong whistleblowing, with 29% raising the concern four times. 
The study uses a power model to hypothesise retaliation and effectiveness of weak and strong whis-
tleblowing, but finds little support for the power model, and does not provide findings for specific 
internal and external recipients. Finally, Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2015) use data from a survey 
of NHS Trusts in the UK, showing that internally more than half of the Trust employees raise their 
concern first with their line manager either informally (52.3%) or in writing (7.3%). The first external 
recipient of concerns is their trade union (38%), followed closely by professional body (35%). The 
study does not give further specification about internal or external paths. However, it does show that 
those who followed their organisation’s whistleblowing procedure were more likely to proceed to 
raise their concern externally when internal recipients showed to be ineffective or resulted in retalia-
tion. 
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Hence whilst some research suggests whistleblowing is a process of both real and anticipated re-
sponses to the raising of a concern, the whistleblowing literature has so far mainly developed on the 
assumption that whistleblowing is a one-off decision. This paper aims to provide insights into whis-
tleblowing as a protracted process, based on data tracking the path of how concerns are raised, iden-
tifying patterns of responses, and effectiveness along that path. We aim to provide insights that are 
more detailed than merely distinguishing between internal and external whistleblowing. To facilitate 
our exploration of the data, we formulate hypotheses in the next section. 
 
Hypotheses 
This section develops hypotheses around the three research questions driving our exploration of whis-
tleblowing as a protracted process: what is the typical sequence of recipients, at what point in the 
process does whistleblowing become effective in stopping wrongdoing, and how does retaliation 
change throughout the process? 
 
RQ1: If whistleblowing is a protracted process, what is the typical sequence of recipients? 
In an experimental study Park et al (2008) found that people prefer to raise a concern inside their 
organisation. Mansbach and Bachner (2010), also in an experimental study, found that people’s will-
ingness to raise a concern decreased with each further attempt, regardless of whether they were asked 
about their willingness to report internally or externally. Response options with internal recipients 
were preferred over those with an external recipient. 
Hence, if whistleblowing is a protracted process, we expect to find that even though the number of 
people tails off as the process protracts, people tend to raise a concern more than once. Also, because 
people prefer to raise a concern inside the organisation, in a protracted process we expect people to 
raise a concern with an internal recipient before doing so with an external recipient. 
H1: People raise a concern more than once. 
H2: People raise a concern internally before doing so externally. 
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In an Australian field study, Donkin et al (2008) found that line managers and higher management 
were by far the most used ‘ports of call’ for whistleblowers. This is in line with what Rothschild and 
Miethe (1999) found, namely that people inadvertently find themselves in a whistleblowing situation, 
the making of which is co-determined by how line managers and higher management react to workers 
who raise a concern. Donkin et al’s (2008) study was carried out with a sample of public sector 
workers. The sample in our research includes whistleblowers from the public, private, and not-for-
profit sectors. However, there is no reason to anticipate any differences across different sectors. 
Hence in terms of which internal recipients are most used by whistleblowers to raise a concern with, 
we expect to find the same in our UK sample as in Donkin et al’s (2008) Australian sample. 
H3: Line managers and Higher management are the most used recipients for internal whis-
tleblowing. 
Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) used Near and Miceli’s (1995) power model to examine whistleblow-
ing in Norwegian organisations. This approach assumed that membership of a decision-making group 
- or being in communication with those who make decisions - is a source of power relevant to one’s 
ability to raise a concern, because such contacts entail opportunities not only to report problematic 
situations to important people in the organisation, but also to explain the concern and formulate ar-
guments. The variables examined by Skiveness and Trygstad (2010) include education, tenure, type 
of employment, hierarchical position, and union contact. Based on this they expected that whistle-
blowers with more power would be more likely to continue to raise their concern. They found that 
only union contact made it more likely that people would raise their concern outside of line manage-
ment but internal to the organisation. Moreover, a higher level of education correlated with a lesser 
likelihood to raise the concern to an external recipient. Thus we expect, following Near and Miceli’s 
(1995) power model and Skiveness and Trygstad’s (2010) findings of internal and external differ-
ences, that when whistleblowers escalate their concern, those with more power tend to remain inside, 
using channels outside of line management. 
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H4: Whistleblowers with more power are more likely to use different internal recipients 
before going outside. 
 
RQ2: At what point in the protracted process does whistleblowing become an effective way to stop 
wrongdoing? 
In the previous section we mentioned how Near and Miceli’s (1995) model propositions that whis-
tleblowing will be more effective if the concern is raised with a powerful recipient. They argue that 
internal recipients can be just as credible as external recipients. Regulators and independent bodies 
(police or professional bodies) are external agencies bestowed with the authority to safeguard ethical 
standards. The same holds for specialist channels such as internal audit or compliance as the internal 
safeguards of professional standards. The extant literature remains ambivalent on this. Miceli and 
Near (2002) test differences in effectiveness of internal and external whistleblowing in three field 
studies of US federal employees and North American auditors, but find no significant difference. 
Apaza and Chang (2011) analysed two cases from Peru and South Korea, and found that external 
recipients and media support were crucial in making whistleblowing effective. Dworkin and Baucus 
(1998) find in their multi-case analysis that in contrast to internal whistleblowers, external whistle-
blowers ‘often triggered investigations, remedial actions or other changes by the organization’ (p. 
1295). Dworkin and Baucus (1998) theorise that blowing the whistle externally puts the organisation 
under greater pressure to respond to them than with internal whistleblowing because an external re-
cipient gives the concern legitimacy and organisations cannot simply ignore the concern. This then 
leads to more effective whistleblowing. 
Hence in a protracted process, where external whistleblowing tends to happen after ineffective inter-
nal whistleblowing, we would expect that only powerful external recipients can make the escalated 
whistleblowing effective. We use a sample from the UK where regulators are mandated as ‘prescribed 
persons’ under the Public Interest Disclosure Act. Thus, we expect regulators to be more effective 
recipients than other external recipients. 
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H5: External whistleblowing to a regulator leads to more effective whistleblowing. 
 
RQ3: How does retaliation change throughout the process?  
Smith (2014) cites O’Day (1974) who researched patterns of intimidation towards employees who 
suggest reforms, and found a pattern of successive rituals that lead to the expulsion of the whistle-
blower: nullification (denial that there is a problem) is followed by isolation (this would both be 
informal retaliation and blocking resources in our coding); after that there is defamation of the whis-
tleblower (this would be blocking resources and formal retaliation). These three ‘rituals’ aim to cause 
the whistleblower to quit, either by leaving the organisation or going on sick leave. O’Day (1974) 
writes that the final ritual is to force an ‘involuntary withdrawal’ by firing the whistleblower. Smith 
(2014) comments that the cases in Dworkin and Baucus (1998) were almost never subjected to 
O’Day’s phases, and that they presented cases where management fired whistleblowers immediately.  
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that external whistleblowing correlates with more 
retaliation. This however does not take into regard whistleblowing as a protracted process nor does it 
distinguish between types of retaliation. Smith (2014) also finds more retaliation following external 
whistleblowing but explains this differently depending on at what stage the whistleblower goes ex-
ternal. When the first recipient is an external one, the whistleblower suffers retaliation because ‘initial 
reporting through external avenues breaks with the “proper channels” set out in the law’ (p. 242). 
However, when the whistleblower goes external at a later stage, retaliation can ‘reflect the fact that 
by the time whistleblowers report externally, internal processes for handling their reports have already 
gone badly wrong, so that further action from any source is unlikely to improve the situation’ (p. 243, 
emphasis in original). This leads Smith (2014) to suggest that more retaliation for external whistle-
blowing at a later stage is merely a continuation of retaliation following previous internal whistle-
blowing. Rather than seeing the internal/external position of the recipient as influencing the likeli-
hood of dismissal, the argument is that it is the protractedness of the whistleblowing that makes dis-
missal more likely.  
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H6: Dismissal becomes more likely as the whistleblowing process protracts. 
 
Method 
Data collection 
Every time someone comes to PCAW for advice, a PCAW advisor takes notes on the nature of the 
concern and the unique situation of the whistleblower. This helps PCAW to give advice when the 
whistleblower calls back. All notes of a particular whistleblower together form a whistleblower case 
in the PCAW database. Hence, for each whistleblower PCAW advises, the PCAW database includes 
a narrative of their whistleblowing journey. For this paper we use data from a wider research project 
that included a content analysis of 1,000 of these journey narratives (PCAW, 2013). The ‘narrator’ is 
not the whistleblower; it is the PCAW advisor who makes these notes. Some information is registered 
in a structured way (formal position, industry, type of wrongdoing). Most of these advisor notes are 
made in an attempt to get a chronological account of what has happened to the whistleblower. In this 
sense, the notes can be regarded as resulting from a semi-structured interview between the advice 
giver and the whistleblower.   
This research has been approved by the University of Greenwich Research Ethics Committee (Ref 
11/12.3.5.21). To avoid using case files from on-going cases, we started with entries in the PCAW 
database from December 2010 and worked backwards in time until 1,000 journey narratives had been 
coded. Thus, the sample consists of 1,000 cases from the PCAW advice line between 30 December 
2010 and 20 August 2009. We only included entries where the contact with the whistleblower was 
through the phone. We excluded entries where the call for advice came from those other than the 
whistleblower. We further excluded entries where there was no information on the type of wrongdo-
ing or industry sector of the organisation the whistleblower was working for. 
At the start of the project, two researchers independently coded the same 90 narratives. These 90 were 
first cleared of any content that would allow the identification of the organisation or individuals, by 
PCAW to ensure confidentiality in relation to the users of the advice line. The researchers first coded 
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20 and then 30 narratives to develop the code book. A further 10 narratives were double coded at 
three subsequent instances to get a shared understanding of the coding categories and to ensure con-
sistent coding. At each instance differences in coding would be discussed and clarified. A shared 
understanding was reached after the third session. A final double coding of 10 random narratives did 
not reveal any differences.   
All variables were nominal-level variables, except the timing of the contact with PCAW (after how 
many attempts to raise a concern did the whistleblower contact the PCAW advice line).  We coded 
variables relating to industry, type of wrongdoing, frequency and duration of the wrongdoing, formal 
position of the whistleblower and whether the wrongdoer’s hierarchical position was higher, equal 
to, or lower than that of the whistleblower. We also coded variables relating to the first four times 
someone had tried to raise a concern: with whom they had raised their concern, anticipated and actual 
responses from management and co-workers, whether the wrongdoing had been investigated or 
stopped, and what happened to the wrongdoer.  
Sample 
It is important to point out this research is based on secondary data. The narratives were written by 
PCAW staff for the purpose of giving advice, not for research purposes. The implication is that for 
most variables not every case included data. Another implication is that we do not have information 
relating to gender or age of the whistleblowers in our sample, as PCAW does not record this data. 
The top six industries advice seekers to PCAW worked in were: health (14.8%), care (14.3%), edu-
cation (11.1%), charities (8.9%), local government (6.9%), and financial services (6.7%). According 
to Census 2011 data, 13% of employed people in England and Wales work within the health and 
social work sector, 10% work in education, 6% work in public administration, and 4% in financial 
services. In our sample, callers working in the health and care sectors add up to 29%, compared with 
the 13% in the Census data. This means that those working in caring environments, where patients, 
vulnerable people or children are involved, tend to contact the advice line more than workers in other 
sectors. Perhaps this is due to the nature of their work, media attention for NHS whistleblowers, 
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policy agendas, scandals or awareness of PCAW. Other industries included in our sample were: retail 
(4.4%), manufacturing (3.3%), food/beverage (2.9%), transport (2.7%), construction (2.1%), lei-
sure/hospitality (2.1%), utilities (1.5%), science/technology (1.2%), and a number of industries had a 
very marginal (<1%) presence in our sample (including insurance, central government, police, hous-
ing, legal services, pharmaceutical, quango, agriculture, forestry, armed services, mining, oil, media). 
The top five concerns in the sample (n= 1,000) relate to the following types of wrongdoing: ethical 
(19%), financial malpractice (19%), work safety (16%), public safety (11%), and patient safety (8%). 
Other concerns are about environment, discrimination/harassment or consumer and competition reg-
ulation. Ethical concerns include abuse of position, cronyism and breach of policy, confidentiality, 
manipulation of scientific research, etc. Financial malpractice includes accounting fraud, corruption, 
bribery and attempts to cover these up. Work safety concerns usually relate to health and safety in 
the workplace principally affecting employees. This includes unsafe machinery, no appropriate safety 
equipment, etc. Public safety is where the safety of the public is at stake and can also include the 
safety of the employees. This includes faulty wiring on a train track, unsafe meat in a supermarket, 
etc. Patient safety includes malpractices where patients are or might be harmed, e.g. lack of qualified 
personnel, breach of procedures to distribute medication in a hospital, physical or psychological harm 
to patients, etc. 
Wrongdoing might be a one-off incident or re-occurring malpractice, e.g. one incident of abuse in 
care or on-going neglect. In 86% of the cases someone raised a concern about a re-occurring wrong-
doing. In 43% of the cases the duration of the wrongdoing was less than six months. In 33% this was 
between six months and two years. The duration of the wrongdoing did not necessarily imply that the 
whistleblower had been raising the concern for that duration. 
In terms of the whistleblower’s formal power in the organisation, our sample ranges from unskilled 
workers at the bottom (13%, e.g. carers, support workers, bartenders) followed by administrative/cler-
ical positions (8%, e.g. office administrators, secretaries, advisers), skilled workers (27%, e.g. bro-
kers, chefs, engineers), professionals (26%, e.g. nurses, doctors, teachers, accountants), managers 
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(15%, e.g. line managers, general managers) and executives at the top of the organisational structure 
(2%). Others (9%) are scientists and researchers. Given the wide variety of organisations and sectors 
people in our sample worked for, and the often inflated use of job titles, we coded the whistleblowers 
in one of the above categories based on a combination of their position and authority. It is important 
to note that even an executive can be faced with a wrongdoer who is equally powerful than they are 
- imagine a COO who becomes aware of a CFO’s wrongdoing. The notion executive means part of 
the top management team. Perhaps the most famous example of an ‘executive whistleblowers’ is 
Michael Woodford who as the CEO of Olympus blew the whistle about payments to obscure compa-
nies in the Cayman Islands (Woodford, 2012). Of course, he had raised a concern about these pay-
ments vis-a-vis his executive team, and after that with the board. He was dismissed from his role of 
CEO but kept his seat on the board. He nevertheless raised his concern with the shareholders, some 
of whom demanded an investigation. 
In the majority of instances in our sample the wrongdoer has a hierarchically higher position than the 
whistleblower in the organisation (72%). In 24% the wrongdoer has an equal position, and in 4% a 
lower position. 
We also coded, for the first four attempts a whistleblower makes to raise a concern, with whom they 
raised their concern, what the response from management was, and what happened to the wrongdoing. 
We clarify and discuss our nominal codings for these variables when we present findings from our 
exploration in the paper. 
Limitations 
A further reflection with regard to our data and methods of analysis is required here. Our data set is 
unique but at the same time suffers from limitations. As mentioned in the previous section we used 
notes advisors had made during interactions with whistleblowers. For each case the notes unraveled 
the chronology of events: a sequence of who whistleblowers raised their concern with, how manage-
ment had reacted both towards them as well as towards the wrongdoing at each instance, etc. This is 
excellent data to document whistleblowing processes. Most of the case narratives are the result of 
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more than one interaction, as 44% of our sample had called the advice line twice, 10% three times, 
another 10% four times, and 4% more than four times. We know of no other whistleblowing research 
using this type of data. 
Despite its uniqueness and suitability to study the whistleblowing process, our data has serious limi-
tations. First of all, one implication of using secondary data was that we could not code every variable 
for every case. In many cases, the advisor notes did not include information needed to obtain codes 
for certain variables. Obviously, missing values restrict the possibilities of analysing the data. For 
example, if a whistleblower did not call the helpline back, we did not have data on the effect of their 
whistleblowing in terms of effectiveness or retaliation. Thus, some of the analyses are carried out on 
small subsamples. We report the n cases where we had data for each cross tab, and also how we 
arrived at a measure for significance. Our decision to use nominal variables no doubt contributes to 
the limitation in techniques we could use to analyse the data, e.g. our data and the way we code it 
does not allow multivariate analysis. However, we believe maintaining nominal values rather than 
ordinal ones or collapsing too many variances into few categories, provides a view of what precisely 
is neglected in previous quantitative whistleblowing research. This has of course implications for the 
generalisability of our findings. On the one hand, we believe that what we find questions the gener-
alisability of other whistleblowing research assuming whistleblowing as a one-off event, or theorising 
the effectiveness based on the legitimacy of the whistleblower within the organisation. On the other 
hand, we use a data set and analysis that make it difficult to generalise our own findings. Therefore, 
our claim can only be a modest one. The claim we make with our research is that our exploration of 
whistleblowing as a process provides findings that call for more distinction between whistleblowing 
variables in relation to timing, i.e. it is a call for more attention in whistleblowing research for the 
protracted process. 
A second limitation of our research is that our sample might not be representative of all whistleblow-
ing in the UK. Rather, our sample is very likely to be biased towards unsuccessful whistleblowing, 
as there would be no reason to call an advice line if raising a concern had been effective in stopping 
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the alleged wrongdoing without resulting in retaliation against the whistleblower. However, we be-
lieve this bias is less severe than relying on legal case documents (e.g. Dworkin and Baucus, 1998) 
as those taking their case to court is a subset of unsuccessful whistleblowing. We also believe that 
the bias towards unsuccessful whistleblowing in our sample is less severe than when a sample is 
constructed based on media reports, as this tends to only use high-profile cases (e.g. Weiskopf and 
Tobias-Miersch, 2016). We suspect the bias in our sample to be similar to that in the sample of Roth-
schild and Miethe (1999) who used a list of 1,000 people asking a whistleblower support group for 
advice. A difference between their and our sample is that ours is not self-selective. Rothschild and 
Miethe (1999) obtained a final sample of 293 whistleblowers who had self-selected to participate by 
either filling in a survey or agreeing to be interviewed over the phone. Our final sample consisted of 
868 people who had contacted a whistleblower advice line. 
A third limitation of our data set relates to possibly important variables we did not code. For example, 
we were unable to code gender and age of the whistleblowers, as this information is not withheld by 
PCAW. Also, we did not code severity of wrongdoing. The whistleblowing literature suggests type 
and severity (or intensity) of wrongdoing as an independent variable. However, we believed that 
calling an advice line implies that the whistleblower perceives the severeness of the wrongdoing be-
yond a certain threshold. Finally, we were unable to code mistaken whistleblowing. People might 
have been raising a concern holding a reasonable yet mistaken belief that a certain practice constituted 
wrongdoing. It is of course impossible for researchers to investigate the correctness of whistleblower 
perceptions. 
 
Findings 
RQ1: If whistleblowing is a protracted process, what is the typical sequence of recipients? 
From our total sample of 1,000 advice line cases, in 132 cases people expressed only an intention to 
raise a concern. Whilst we also coded intentions to raise with a specific recipient further on in the 
whistleblowing process, for the analyses presented in this paper we only use instances where the 
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concern was actually raised. This resulted in a sample of n= 868. Because we rely on secondary data 
from notes made for advising whistleblowers when they called PCAW, in reality the whistleblower 
process might have been further protracted than what we had data for, i.e. a whistleblower might 
continue to raise their concern without calling the PCAW advice line. Hence, in 868 cases a concern 
had been raised at least once, in 484 at least twice, in 142 at least three times, and in 22 cases the 
concern had been raised four times. This means that in 55.8% a concern is raised more than once. 
This confirms H1 (People raise a concern more than once). 
Compared to Donkin et al (2008) who found the average length of the protracted whistleblowing 
process to be 1.9 and 4.3, the average number of times a concern was raised in our sample was 1.74. 
However, we only coded the first four instances in which a concern was raised. 
 
----------- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ----------- 
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When developing the codebook, it was clear that whistleblowers can raise concerns either within the 
organisation (internal), outside of the organisation (external), or with their union if they are a member. 
We further distinguished within the internal category: wrongdoer, line manager, higher manager, 
grievance (where the individual raises their concerns together usually with personal issues via the 
formal grievance procedure), and specialist channel (audit, compliance, hotline). In the external cat-
egory we distinguished between regulator, other independent bodies (police, MP, NGO), and media. 
We coded ‘union’ as a separate recipient, following Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2016) who assert 
that unions are an exceptional recipient with both internal as well as external presence. We did not 
code whether the whistleblower was a union member, although we did come across cases where the 
whistleblower mentioned joining a union to seek help with raising a concern. We coded the recipient 
as ‘other’ where the whistleblower raised a concern to someone who falls outside of the above cate-
gories, for example to customers or funders. This also covers the situation where they have spoken to 
a colleague about their concern (not typically raising a concern). Table 1 gives an overview of inter-
nal, external, and union recipients in the whistleblowing process of our cases, excluding ‘other’. 
 
Whilst we found a substantial decrease in the number of whistleblowers who go on to raise a third 
time, it must be noted that of those who raise a concern a third time about 60% still do so with an 
internal recipient. Even at the fourth instance, an equal number of recipients do so internally or to a 
union (45.5% and 4.5% respectively) as with an external recipient (50%). Hence, our findings con-
firm H2 (People raise a concern internally before doing so externally).  
Our findings give some depth to the previously existing (and mainly experimental) knowledge 
about internal versus external whistleblowing. Not only do whistleblowers tend to raise their con-
cern internally before they do so externally, but they tend to raise internally more than once before 
going external, if they go external at all. In our sample of 868 cases, a concern was raised 1,516 
times, 80.7% of which was internal, 16.6% external, and 2.7% to a union representative. Whilst the 
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number of those making external disclosures increases as the whistleblowing process becomes more 
protracted, it never surpasses the amount of those making internal disclosures.  
 
------------- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ——————— 
 
Figure 1 shows a series of frequencies of who whistleblowers raised their concern with at each at-
tempt. This offers a more detailed overview of the different recipients used by whistleblowers at each 
instance of raising their concern. It shows that 52% of whistleblowers first raised their concern with 
their line manager, and 22% with higher management. When whistleblowers raise their concern a 
second time, 14% do this with their line manager and 33% with higher management. Taken together, 
line management and higher management are the initial recipients of 74% of whistleblower concerns, 
and second-attempt recipients of 47% of whistleblower concerns. This confirms H3 (Line managers 
and Higher management are the most used recipients for internal whistleblowing), and is in line with 
Donkin et al (2008), although our UK data allows to give a more detailed picture of which recipients 
are used by whistleblowers the first four times they raise their concern. Only 7% raised their concern 
initially directly with the wrongdoer, whilst more than half of the whistleblowers in our sample (52%) 
first raised their concern with their line manager. More than one in five (22%) do so with higher 
management in the first instance but a higher proportion (33%) goes to higher management when 
raising their concern a second time. Other recipients showing an increase at the second instance are 
specialist channels, regulators, external bodies, and grievances. Their usage increases even more at 
the third instance. Figure 1 also shows that by the third and fourth attempt whistleblowers are most 
likely to pursue the matter via a grievance procedure. It must be noted that a grievance procedure is 
unsuited to a whistleblowing concern. A grievance procedure is a complaint procedure, and hence 
places the onus on the individual to prove the complaint. A whistleblower however is a witness, 
passing on information to those with a responsibility to address the problem. A witness should not 
have to prove their concern.  
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-------------- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ----------- 
 
In order to identify the most used routes amongst the various recipients, we sorted the sequences 
according to with whom the concern was last raised, and then by length of the sequence. Concerns 
raised with specialist channels, regulators, external agencies, and grievances tend to have longer his-
tories of raising with other recipients. We then looked for patterns within the sequences of recipients 
used by whistleblowers to raise a concern. We disregarded sequences where only one attempt to raise 
a concern was made. A sequence of two or more attempts that occurred at least three times for each 
final recipient was regarded as a salient pattern. There were no patterns in the sequences of four 
attempts. Table 2 gives an overview of the salient patterns. These patterns further confirm the role of 
management as recipients of whistleblower concerns. In more than half of the cases the whistleblow-
ing process ended with either the line manager (27.8%) or higher management (25.2%). The patterns 
also indicate that other recipients tend to receive concerns after the line manager or higher manage-
ment had not been able to prevent escalation of the concern. 
For example, salient patterns where a specialist channel was the final recipient tend to involve line 
manager, higher management or both as previous recipients. This finding has an important implica-
tion for organisational actors operating such a specialist channel - e.g. audit, compliance, hotline. 
These channels are often named in organisational whistleblowing or speak-up policies, and nearly 
always guarantee to the whistleblower that their identity will be kept confidential. Our data suggests 
that the majority of those using a specialist channel have already raised their concern with someone 
else before using the specialist channel. The implication is that in most cases, either the whistle-
blower’s line manager, higher management, or both know who has raised the concern that audit or 
compliance might investigate. Specialist channels as recipients of whistleblower concerns might act 
wisely to make whistleblowers aware of this risk, and in any case carry out investigations assuming 
others will know who the whistleblower is. 
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Other patterns also underline the huge role of management’s responsiveness (Vandekerckhove et al, 
2014). Where a regulator was the final recipient, the emerging patterns also involved line managers 
and higher management. Similar patterns emerge where the final recipient was an external agency 
other than the regulator. A substantial amount of our whistleblower cases ended in whistleblowers 
opting for a grievance route, meaning they raise their concern through a formal grievance procedure 
in the context of retaliation they suffer. These also tend to be protracted and salient sequences in-
volved higher management, line managers or both. 
We also analysed our data to see whether the whistleblower’s formal power in the organisation made 
a difference with regard to whom they raised their concern with (H4). We first cross tabulated for 
each of the four attempts, the whistleblower’s formal power within the organisation with the recipient 
they raised their concern with. In order to get some idea of the statistical significance we created 
dummy variables for each of the formal power categories. For example, in the dummy variable for 
‘unskilled’ we coded unskilled worker as 1 and the others as 0, in the dummy variable ‘skilled’ we 
coded skilled worker as 1 and the others as 0, etc. We ran cross tabs for these with recipients for the 
first three attempts. Table 3 gives an overview of the cross tabs that showed to be significant at the 
first whistleblowing attempt. Table 4 gives an overview of the significant cross tabs at the second 
whistleblowing attempt. 
 
---------------- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ——————— 
---------------- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ——————— 
 
Table 3 shows unskilled workers, skilled workers, managers, and executives are significantly differ-
ent from each other in who they initially raise their concern with. At the second attempt, unskilled 
and professional are significantly different from the others. Hence it seems that formal power of the 
whistleblower influences how the process begins, but not so much how it protracts.  
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In order to test H4, we also collapsed the recipient variable into internal recipients (line manager, 
higher management, wrongdoer, specialist channel, grievance), external recipients (regulator, exter-
nal, media, other), and union. We ran cross tabs for the formal whistleblower power dummy variables 
with the collapsed recipients for the first three attempts. The collapsed recipients internal/external/un-
ion did not show any significant differences across the formal whistleblower power categories. How-
ever, when recipients are not collapsed into the categories internal/external/union, we do see signifi-
cant differences for formal power (tables 3 and 4). This leads us to reject H4 (Whistleblowers with 
more power are more likely to use different internal recipients before going outside). Formal whis-
tleblower power is related to how the whistleblowing process starts, but not in terms of internal versus 
external. 
Our findings show that lower down the ladder the worker was less likely to approach higher manage-
ment, this is in direct contrast with those in more senior positions: unskilled 14.2%, skilled 12.8%, 
management 37.6%. Unskilled workers were more likely than other workers to approach the wrong-
doer in the first instance (11.5%), and also to make a disclosure to external recipients other than 
regulators as a second step (17.5%). Specialist channels are not on blue collar workers’ radar and it 
seems as though this key group of workers did not explore internal options aside from their line 
manager. Those in more senior positions such as professionals, management, and executives - were 
more likely to raise concerns through a specialist channel at any step. This group is less likely to raise 
concerns with a regulator but more likely to go to the media at an early stage. 
 
RQ2: At what point in the protracted process does whistleblowing become an effective way to stop 
wrongdoing? 
In our data, we coded how the whistleblower perceived the impact of raising the concern on what the 
organisation was doing about the wrongdoing. Coding categories were: ‘nothing is done’ (where the 
whistleblower expresses that no action has been taken, for example where the whistleblower has been 
ignored or the wrongdoing is denied), ‘investigating but low expectations’ (where the recipient of the 
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information is conducting an investigation but the whistleblower lacks confidence in the investiga-
tion, for example where the investigation is being headed by someone the whistleblower does not 
trust or fear that there will be a whitewash), ‘investigating with high expectations’ (as previous but 
where the whistleblower has confidence in the investigation), and ‘stopped’ (where the wrongdoing 
is stopped). 
We initially did a cross tabulation of how the whistleblower perceived the impact of raising a concern, 
per recipient and attempt. In order to get an idea about significance, we created dummy variables for 
the first three attempts with collapsed nominal categories for change to wrongdoing: ‘nothing is done’ 
and ‘investigating (low expectations)’ were coded 0, ‘investigating (high expectations)’ and ‘stopped’ 
were coded as 1. We then reran the cross tabs with the collapsed variables. Table 5 shows the results 
of cross tabs for the first and second attempts. These indicate that the recipient does make a difference 
in terms of how effective whistleblowers perceive their whistleblowing to be, at least at the first and 
second attempt.  
 
------------ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ---------- 
 
Overall the most common response is that nothing is done about the concern. The data also suggests 
that persistent whistleblowers tend to perceive themselves as more effective. The percentage of whis-
tleblowers who believed their whistleblowing triggered a serious investigation increases from only 
16.1% at the first attempt, to 24.7% at the second. 
Three recipients appear to be more effective than others: specialist channels, regulators, and external 
independent bodies. However, although whistleblowing to a specialist channel appears to trigger 
more investigations, in at least half of these instances the whistleblower did not have trust in the 
seriousness of the investigation. 
 
————- INSERT TABLE 6 ————— 
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Table 6 shows a cross tab detail for regulators and for other external recipients. We see two salient 
points. The first is that regulators seem less likely to neglect a whistleblower concern if it has been 
raised previously with another recipient: cf. in table 6 ‘nothing is done’ shows a downward trend 
(attempt 1, 2 and 3) for ‘regulator’ and an upward trend for ‘external’. The second salient aspect is 
that whistleblowers seem to perceive regulators as more effective later in the whistleblowing process, 
and other external bodies less effective: cf. in table 6 ‘investigating (high expect)’ and ‘stopped’ taken 
together shows an upward trend (attempt 1, 2 and 3) for ‘regulator’ and a downward trend for ‘exter-
nal’. Hence, external recipients seem to lead to more effective whistleblowing, and regulators even 
more so than other external recipients. This confirms H5 (External whistleblowing to a regulator leads 
to more effective whistleblowing). 
 
RQ3: How does retaliation change throughout the process? 
In only 38.1% of our case narratives (331 out of 868 cases) did whistleblowers mention a response 
from management, suggesting that in 61.9% of cases the management response was not of signifi-
cance to the whistleblower when they contacted PCAW for advice. Whilst we must assume that our 
sample is biased towards unsuccessful whistleblowing - a whistleblower would not contact PCAW 
when their whistleblowing was successful - our finding that in only 38.1% of our sample were the 
responses from managers towards whistleblowers salient for the latter suggests that in the other cases 
whistleblowers contacted PCAW mainly because their whistleblowing had so far been ineffective. 
We noted in our sample that there were a number of common responses from management that whis-
tleblowers may experience. These were coded as follows: ‘informal’ (closer monitoring, ostracised, 
verbal harassment), ‘blocking resources’ (blocking access to emails, information, training, hours), 
‘formal’ (relocation, demotion, job reassigned, suspended, disciplined), ‘dismissal’ (being fired), and 
‘support’ (the recipient is taking the issue seriously or has expressed support). Figure 2 shows a bar 
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chart of relative frequency of different responses whistleblowers experienced from their managers 
throughout the whistleblowing process. 
 
------------ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ---------- 
 
Our finding is that both dismissal and formal reprisals such as demotion, relocation, or reassigning 
job responsibilities are the most common type of retaliation, at each attempt. When we look at the 
bar chart in figure 2 we do see a pattern towards more formal and more dismissal as the whistleblow-
ing process protracts. Hence, we can only partially confirm H6 (Dismissal becomes more likely as 
the whistleblowing process protracts); our data is inconclusive as to the differences between formal 
retaliation and dismissal. 
Although the overall pattern in our findings is in accordance with O’Day’s phases, there is a substan-
tial proportion of whistleblowers in our cases who suffered formal retaliation or dismissal immedi-
ately. In order to get more insight into what the contingencies might be with regard to retaliation 
patterns, we present findings on recipients and formal whistleblower power separately. 
Our findings suggest that in contrast to effectiveness, there is less reason to distinguish between dif-
ferent external recipients when it comes to retaliation. We did not arrive at convincing findings for 
maintaining the question whether blowing the whistle to a regulator might lead to different whistle-
blower experiences than blowing the whistle to a professional body or NGO. We created dummy 
variables to perform a chi-square test, one comparing responses after whistleblowing to a regulator 
with other recipients (regulator coded as 1, others as 0), and one comparing responses after whistle-
blowing to an external body with other recipients (external body coded as 1, others coded as 0). We 
found only responses after blowing the whistle to an external body (not a regulator) at the third at-
tempt to be significantly different from other recipients. People who raised their concern to an exter-
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nal body at the third attempt experienced less dismissal or formal retaliation. However, absolute num-
bers are very low (n=58 for all cases with data for management response at third attempt), and we 
cannot see how to explain why the difference would only occur at the third attempt and not sooner. 
 
———— INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ——— 
 
The formal power of the whistleblower does seem to make a difference for how retaliation develops. 
We recoded responses from management as follows: ‘support’ as 1, ‘informal reprisals’, ‘blocking 
resources’, and ‘formal reprisals’ as 2, and ‘dismissal’ as 3. We ran cross tabs for formal whistle-
blower power with the collapsed variable. Chi-square tests showed only the cross tab for the first 
attempt to blow the whistle was significant. These are presented in table 7 and indicate that initial 
responses relate with formal power of the whistleblower. Executives received more support, and un-
skilled workers experienced most retaliation short of dismissal. Managers were least likely to receive 
support, and managers and administrative staff were most likely to get fired at their first attempt to 
raise their concern.  
 
Discussion 
Protracted whistleblowing 
Our findings, especially the support for H1, H2 and H3 support whistleblowing as a protracted pro-
cess. The increased use of higher management in the second instance, and specialist channel, regula-
tor, and external bodies in the second and third instance suggests whistleblowers seek to raise their 
concern with increasingly independent recipients, rather than merely decide to blow the whistle ex-
ternally if an internal channel is unsuccessful. Our exploration of the data with regard to H4 indicated 
that formal power of the whistleblower did not determine whether the process protracted internally 
or externally. Rather, formal whistleblower power did determine with which recipient the process 
starts. Near and Miceli (1985: 4) stipulated that whistleblowers raise their concern with ‘persons or 
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organizations that may be able to effect action’. The ‘may be able’ refers of course to the whistle-
blowers’ perception of that actor’s ability. Our findings suggest this perception is dynamic. Following 
Rothschild and Miethe (1999) we can argue that the perception of someone’s ability to ‘effect action’ 
is determined by the response of the previous recipient. However, this might not be the only factor at 
play. The whistleblower’s perception of who is able to effect action to stop the wrongdoing might 
also be influenced by the awareness of oneself as a whistleblower. Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch 
(2016) show in a case analysis of the whistleblowing process of Guido Strack - a European Commis-
sion whistleblower - how the self-identification as a whistleblower came to articulation only after a 
number of internal attempts to question a practice and raise a concern about supplier contract 
breaches. Andrade (2015) also suggests that the moment of self-identification as a whistleblower 
happens after internal questioning, and is a constitutive element of the turn from internal to external 
whistleblowing. Our data does not allow us to determine when exactly people calling the PCAW 
advice line started to self-identify as a whistleblower. However, the moment they call the PCAW 
advice line suggests this is somewhere during the whistleblowing process. In our sample, only 5% 
called the PCAW advice line before raising their concern with anyone. The majority called the advice 
line after raising their concern once (38%) or twice (39%). A further 15% called after raising their 
concern three times, and 3% did so after raising their concern four times. Public Concern at Work 
brands itself as ‘The Whistleblowing Charity’, hence we can assume that callers recognise what they 
have done as whistleblowing when they call the PCAW advice line. The literature (Andrade, 2015; 
Rothschild and Miethe, 1999; Weisskopf and Tobias-Miersch, 2016) suggests reactions to earlier 
attempts to raise their concern triggers such a recognition, and thus the self-identification as a whis-
tleblower. 
Given the apparent importance of line managers and higher management in protracted whistleblow-
ing, we must acknowledge that often these recipients are where the buck seems to stop. A closer look 
at sequences where line managers are the final (but not first) recipient shows that in 23% of these 
cases a concern was previously raised directly with the wrongdoer. This sequence suggests that the 
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individual believed they could rectify the perceived wrongdoing themselves through open and direct 
communication with the alleged wrongdoer. They subsequently call upon their line manager to step 
in when their direct attempt fails. Often two subsequent attempts were made with the line manager. 
This suggests that the individual perceives their line manager has ignored their first attempt to raise 
the concern, but still trusts the line manager to be willing and able to take action. In some cases an 
attempt to raise the concern was made with higher management before turning to the line manager. 
The individual might be following instructions from higher management who believes the concern 
needs to be dealt with at lower level. The question remains whether there was any follow up with 
regard to how the individual’s line manager has dealt with the concern. 
The emerging patterns where higher management was the final recipient point at a more hierarchical 
rationale of whistleblower strategies. For sequences of two attempts these were: LM-HM, W-HM, 
and SP-HM. Sequences of three attempts: LM-LM-HM, LM-HM-HM, and HM-SP-HM. Most of 
these sequences resonate with a hierarchical rationale: if the line manager fails to take action or where 
the line manager is the wrongdoer, the individual raises the concern with higher management. More 
surprising are the sequences where the individual makes two attempts to raise their concern with 
higher management, or returns to higher management after raising their concern with a specialist 
channel (such as internal audit or compliance). These suggest that whistleblowers are quite persistent 
in assuming higher management acts in good faith. In other words, it often takes a protracted process 
of raising a concern and interpreting the response before a whistleblower realises those in control of 
the organisation are not able or not willing to deal adequately with concerns about wrongdoing. 
Overall our findings suggest two things. One is that if the formal power of the whistleblower is a 
determining factor in who they raise their concern with, it is more a question of when rather than 
whether they will approach a particular recipient. The other suggestion is that the relation between 
choice of recipient and whistleblowers’ formal power might be more usefully theorised not in terms 
of ‘how far is the whistleblower willing to go’ but rather which recipient is most in line with the 
whistleblower’s mode of thought. For example, Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) rely to a great extent 
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on union density in the Norwegian workplace to explain the high incidence of internal whistleblowing 
in Norway. It is the contact with union representatives that makes the union viable as a whistleblow-
ing recipient. We can explain in a similar vein why unskilled and skilled workers tend not to use 
specialist channels. Organisations often advertise these as whistleblowing hotlines (either to internal 
audit or to externally operated anonymous channels). It is possible that blue collar workers do not 
differentiate between different levels of management - management is simply the other side. Thus, 
after having raised their concern with their line manager, relatively few of them see any recourse in 
an internal route such as a hotline to management. 
We can now answer our first research question: ‘If whistleblowing is a protracted process, what is 
the typical sequence of recipients?’ Our findings suggest that whistleblowing is a protracted process 
and that this process is internally more protracted than previously documented. Line management as 
well as higher management are by far the most used recipients for whistleblowers. The sequence of 
recipients seems to be further influenced by the previous recipient: most sequences follow a hierar-
chical rationale indicating the whistleblower searches a more independent recipient rather than merely 
an external one. However, the formal power of the whistleblower seems to influence which recipients 
are in scope as a further whistleblowing option. 
 
Effective whistleblowing 
Our findings corroborate with those of Dworkin and Baucus (1998), suggesting legitimacy and cred-
ibility of the recipient leverages the effectiveness of whistleblowing only for external recipients. Yet 
our findings also suggest that regulators - who in the UK are mandated as prescribed persons in the 
whistleblowing legislation - are more effective than other external recipients (H5). Hence the answer 
to our second research question ‘At what point in the protracted process does whistleblowing become 
an effective way to stop wrongdoing?’ is when the organisation is no longer in control over whether 
or not the concern is legitimate. 
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This provides ground to search for an alternative theoretical framing of power than the one Near and 
Miceli (1995) have put forward. In their framework, it is the power of the recipient which can enhance 
the power of the whistleblower. Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) offer an alternative framing. Their 
focus on union mechanisms gives much greater weight to institutional arrangements beyond the or-
ganisational level than Near and Miceli (1995) seem to do. Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) use a power 
model to theorise in a similar vein that employees with higher education will be have more credibility 
and hence be more effective. However, their findings contradict their expectations. They note that 
‘Surprisingly, highly educated employees were less likely to achieve changes when they blew the 
whistle than others’ (Skivenes and Trygstad 2010: 1086). Our findings suggest this is not surprising 
at all. In our sample cases external whistleblowing was more successful than internal whistleblowing. 
Hence, if education level correlates with less external whistleblowing (Skivenes and Trygstad 2010), 
then we would expect education level to have a negative relationship with effectiveness. The conclu-
sion must be that for effective whistleblowing the power of the whistleblower matters far less than 
the choice of the recipient. 
 
Retaliation 
Smith and Brown (2008) found that in the Australian public sector the most common type of whis-
tleblower retaliation was informal reprisal. The overall pattern in our UK findings is that formal re-
taliation and dismissal increase at each attempt. Smith (2014) reviews the literature on whistleblower 
retaliation and notes that position and power in the organisation is the most consistent predictor of 
retaliation, with those in more senior occupational levels less likely to experience retaliation for blow-
ing the whistle. Along with the partial confirmation of H6, further exploration of our UK data suggest 
that workers with less formal power (unskilled, skilled, admin) seem to be tolerated longer. For them, 
O’Day’s four rituals of expulsion seemed to describe more accurately the protracted retaliation they 
experienced. Those with more formal power (professionals, managers, and executives) experience 
dismissal earlier in the whistleblowing process. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that 
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external whistleblowing correlates with more retaliation. This however does not take into regard 
whistleblowing as a protracted process nor does it distinguish between types of retaliation. Smith 
(2014) also finds more retaliation following external whistleblowing but explains this differently de-
pending on at what stage the whistleblower goes external. When the first recipient is an external one, 
the whistleblower suffers retaliation because ‘initial reporting through external avenues breaks with 
the “proper channels” set out in the law’ (p. 242). However, when the whistleblower goes external at 
a later stage, retaliation can ‘reflect the fact that by the time whistleblowers report externally, internal 
processes for handling their reports have already gone badly wrong, so that further action from any 
source is unlikely to improve the situation’ (p. 243, emphasis in original). 
Our findings do not corroborate those of the Australian research (Smith 2014). Just as with our first 
research question - how the whistleblowing process protracts - we find that with regard to retaliation 
formal whistleblower power can influence how the process starts, but this is of much less or no im-
portance for how the process protracts or how retaliation develops further. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we used secondary data in the form of whistleblower narratives from an advice line in 
the UK to explore whistleblowing as a protracted process. Our findings suggest that formal whistle-
blower power influences how the whistleblowing process starts in terms of to whom the whistle is 
blown and what happens to the whistleblower, but that this influence dies out as the process protracts. 
Our findings also suggest that a recipient’s institutional power rather than the formal whistleblower 
power influences the effectiveness of the whistleblowing. 
We believe our findings lead to a questioning of the generalisability of research designs that concep-
tualise whistleblowing as a one-off event. In particular, we found that the whistleblowing process 
generally entails two or even three internal attempts to raise a concern before an external attempt is 
made, if it is made at all. We have also provided ground for further research to reconsider internal/ex-
ternal differentiation by seeking to measure the independence of the recipient. The overall pattern 
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found in our research makes it plausible that whistleblowers search for a more independent recipient 
at each successive attempt to raise their concern. 
Most of the extant whistleblowing literature theorises successful whistleblowing in terms of the le-
gitimacy and credibility of the whistleblower within their organisation. Our findings do not contradict 
this line of reasoning but they support Skivenes and Trygstad’s (2010) emphasis on institutional 
power beyond the organisational level. Where whistleblowing is immediately successful - effective 
and safe - this might be because the whistleblower has legitimacy and credibility. Yet when whistle-
blowing is unsuccessful at the first attempt, and hence becomes a protracted process, the whistle-
blower seems to have little avail in seeking to establish legitimacy within the organisation. Current 
whistleblowing theory has little to offer for those whistleblowers. We believe our research in this 
paper supports the search for an alternative, more institutional level analysis of whistleblowing. This 
resonates with Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) who explain the high rate of successful whistleblowing 
in Norway through high levels of unionisation and Norwegian industrial relations. These have estab-
lished a general attitude that employers do not have full control over how work is organised and how 
human relations within workplaces are shaped. Union density in the UK is a fraction of that in Nor-
way, and whistleblowing to a union represented a very small proportion in our sample. However, our 
findings suggest that whistleblowing might be more successful if its protracted process involved a 
third, external player earlier on. 
 
Compliance with ethical standards 
Funding: this research was funded by the University of Greenwich (Work and Employment Rela-
tions Unit), and Public Concern at Work. 
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in ac-
cordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with 
the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed 
36 
consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. The research was ap-
proved by the University of Greenwich Research Ethics Committee (Ref 11/12.3.5.21).  
 
References  
Andrade, J. A. (2015). Reconceptualising Whistleblowing in a Complex World. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 128(2), 321-335. 
Apaza, C.R. & Chang, Y. (2011). What makes whistleblowing effective: Whistleblowing in Peru 
and South Korea. Public Integrity, 13(2), 113-130. 
Blenkinsopp, J., & Edwards, M. S. (2008). On not blowing the whistle: Quiescent silence as an 
emotion episode. Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making Research on Emotion in Organiza-
tions, 4, 181-206. 
Brown, A. J., Lewis, D., Moberly, R., & Vandekerckhove, W. (Eds.). (2014). International Handbook 
on Whistleblowing Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Callahan, E. S., & Dworkin, T. M. (1994). Who blows the whistle to the media, and why: Organiza-
tional characteristics of media whistleblowers. American Business Law Journal, 32(2), 151-
184. 
Donkin, M., Smith, R. & Brown, A. J. (2008). How do officials report? Internal and external whis-
tleblowing. In Brown, A. J. (ed) Whistleblowing in the Australian public sector. Enhancing 
the theory and practice of internal witness management in public sector organisations, 83-
108. Canberra: ANU Press. 
Dworkin, T., & Baucus, M. S. (1998). Internal vs. external whistleblowers: A comparison of whis-
tleblowering processes. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(12), 1281-1298. 
Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C. & Martinko, M. J. (2003). The decision to blow the whistle: A so-
cial information processing framework. Academy of Management Review, 28(1), 107-123. 
37 
Jones, J.C., Spraakman, G. & Sanchez-Rodriguez, C. (2014). What’s in it for me? An examination of 
accounting students’ likelihood to report faculty misconduct. Journal of Business Ethics, 
123(4), 645-667. 
Kaptein, M. (2011). From inaction to external whistleblowing: The influence of the ethical culture 
of organizations on employee responses to observed wrongdoing. Journal of Business Ethics, 
98(3), 513-530. 
Lewis, D. & Vandekerckhove, W. (2015). Does following a whistleblowing procedure make a dif-
ference? The evidence from the research conducted for the Francis Inquiry. In Lewis, D. & 
Vandekerckhove, W. (eds) Developments in whistleblowing research, 85-105. London: Inter-
national Whistleblowing Research Network. 
Lewis, D. & Vandekerckhove, W. (2016). Trade unions and the whistleblowing process in the UK: 
An opportunity for strategic expansion? Journal of Business Ethics, DOI 10.1007/s10551-
016-3015-z 
MacGregor, J., & Stuebs, M. (2014). The Silent Samaritan syndrome: Why the whistle remains un-
blown. Journal of business ethics, 120(2), 149-164. 
Mansbach, A. & Bachner, Y. G. (2010). Internal or external whistleblowing: Nurses’ willingness to 
report wrongdoing. Nursing Ethics, 17(4), 483-490. 
Mesmer-Magnus, J. & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in Organizations: An examination 
of correlates of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 
62, 277-297. 
Miceli, M. P. & Near, J. P. (1992). Blowing the whistle. New York: Lexington Books. 
Miceli, M.P. & Near, J.P.  (2002). What makes whistle-blowers effective? Three field studies. Hu-
man Relations, 55: 455-479.  
Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P.  & Dworkin, T.M. (2008). Whistleblowing in organizations.  New York: 
Routledge. 
38 
Nader, R., Petkas, P.J. & Blackwell, K. (eds) (1972). Whistle Blowing: The report of the conference 
on professional responsibility. New York: Grossman. 
Near, J. P. & Miceli, M. P. (1995). Effective-whistle blowing. Academy of management re-
view, 20(3), 679-708. 
Near, J.P. & Miceli, M.P. (1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 4, 1-16. 
O'Day, R. (1974). Intimidation rituals: Reactions to reform. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sci-
ence, 10(3), 373-386. 
PCAW (2013). Whistleblowing - The Inside Story. London: Public Concern at Work / University of 
Greenwich. 
Rothschild, J. & Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistle-blower disclosures and management retaliation: The 
battle to control information about organization corruption, Work and Occupations, 26(1), 
107-128. 
Sims, R. L. & Keenan, J. P. (1998). Predictors of external whistleblowing: Organizational and inter-
personal variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 411-421. 
Skivenes, M. & Trygstad, S.C. (2010). When whistle-blowing works: The Norwegian case. Human 
Relations, 63: 1071-1097. 
Smith, R. (2014). Whistleblowing and suffering. In A.J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. Moberly & W. Van-
dekerckhove (eds) International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research, 230-249. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar. 
Smith, R. & Brown, A.J. (2008). The good, the bad and the ugly: whistleblowing outcomes. In A.J. 
Brown (ed) Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector, 109-136. Canberra: ANU E 
Press. 
39 
Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A.J. & Tsahuridu, E.E. (2014). Managerial responsiveness to whistle-
blowing: Expanding the research horizon. In A.J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. Moberly & W. Van-
dekerckhove (eds) International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research, 298-327. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar. 
Watts, L. L. & Buckley, M. R. (2015). A Dual-Processing Model of Moral Whistleblowing in Or-
ganizations. Journal of Business Ethics, DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2913-9. 
Woodford, M. (2012). Exposure: Inside the Olympus Scandal. London: Penguin. 
Weiskopf, R. & Tobias-Miersch, Y. (2016). Whistleblowing, Parrhesia and the Contestation of 
Truth in the Workplace. Organization Studies, 37(11), 1621-1640. 
  
40 
Figure 1. Recipients of concerns throughout the whistleblowing process (rounded %) 
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Figure 2. Retaliation throughout the whistleblowing process (rounded %) 
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Table1. Internal and external whistleblowing 
 
 internal external union Total 
first attempt 778 (89.6%) 75 (8.6%) 15 (1.7%) 868 (100.0%) 
second attempt 350 (72.3%) 115 (23.8%) 19 (3.9%) 484 (100.0% 
third attempt 85 (59.9%) 51 (35.9%) 6 (4.2%) 142 (100.0%) 
fourth attempt 10 (45.5%) 11 (50.0%) 1 (4.5%) 22 (100.0%) 
 
  
43 
 
Table 2. Salient patterns in whistleblowing sequences  
 
salient sequences 
(# occurence) 
rounded % of cases 
with  
that final recipient 
 
LM (188) 
LM-LM (18) 
WD-LM (12) 
HM-LM (9) 
78 
7 
5 
4 
cases with LM as final recipient  
n = 241 (27.8% of all cases) 
HM (93) 
LM-HM (64) 
WD-HM (13) 
SP-HM (10) 
LM-HM-HM (5) 
LM-LM-HM (3) 
HM-SP-HM (3) 
42 
29 
6 
5 
2 
1 
1 
cases with HM as final recipient 
n = 219 (25.2% of all cases) 
HM-GR (24) 
LM-GR (19) 
GR (19) 
LM-HM-GR (8) 
LM-EXT-GR (5) 
SP-GR (4) 
23 
18 
18 
8 
5 
4 
cases with GR as final recipient 
n = 106 (12.2% of all cases) 
LM-REG (27) 
REG (18) 
HM-REG (12) 
LM-HM-REG (5) 
29 
19 
13 
5 
cases with REG as final recipient 
n = 93 (10.7% of all cases) 
LM-SP (19) 
SP (12) 
LM-HM-SP  (10) 
HM-SP (8) 
29 
18 
15 
12 
cases with SP as final recipient 
n = 66 (7.6% of all cases) 
LM-EXT (16) 
HM-EXT (11) 
EXT (11) 
LM-HM-EXT (11) 
REG-EXT (3) 
25 
17 
17 
6 
5 
cases with EXT as final recipient 
n = 65 (7.5% of all cases) 
Note: WD= wrongdoer; LM= line manager; HM= higher management; U= union; 
SP= specialist channel; REG= regulator; EXT= external recipient (professional body, 
NGO), GR= grievance procedure; M= media; OT= other 
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Table 3. Crosstab formal whistleblower power per first attempt recipient 
 
 
 
Table 4. Crosstab formal whistleblower power per second attempt recipient 
 
 
  
formal whistle-
blower power n 
recipient  crosstab sig  (per dummy) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  X2 
cells with 
count <5 
unskilled 113 11.5% 56.6% 14.2% 1.8% 0.0% 7.1% 2.7% 3.5% 0.9% 1.8% 100.0% 0.025 8 (40%) 
skilled 235 6.4% 64.3% 12.8% 1.3% 2.1% 3.8% 2.6% 4.3% 0.4% 2.1% 100.0% 0.001 4 (20%) 
manager 125 7.2% 36.8% 37.6% 2.4% 6.4% 3.2% 1.6% 2.4% 0.0% 2.4% 100.0% 0.002 6 (30%) 
executives 22 9.1% 9.1% 45.5% 0.0% 13.6% 4.5% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 100.0% 0.000 10 (50%) 
all 868 7.0% 51.6% 22.5% 1.7% 4.3% 3.6% 2.5% 4.3% 0.5% 2.1% 100.0%   
     
Note recipients: 1= wrongdoer; 2= line manager; 3= higher manage-
ment; 4= union;    5= specialist channel (audit, compli-
ance, HR); 6= regulator; 7= external body (NGO, pro-
fessional body); 8= through grievance procedure; 9= 
media; 10= other 
 
  
 
formal whistle-
blower power n 
recipient  crosstab sig  (per dummy) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  X2 cells with 
count <5 
unskilled 63 1.6% 25.4% 25.4% 3.2% 1.6% 14.3% 17.5% 9.5% 0.0% 1.6% 100.0% 0.036 5 (25%) 
professional 144 1.4% 11.8% 36.8% 4.9% 15.3% 9.0% 8.3% 9.7% 0.0% 2.8% 100.0% 0.039 6 (30%) 
all 484 1.4% 14.0% 32.9% 3.9% 9.9% 11.2% 11.0% 14.0% 0.4% 1.2% 100.0%   
               
Note recipients: 1= wrongdoer; 2= line manager; 3= higher manage-
ment; 4= union;    5= specialist channel (audit, com-
pliance, HR); 6= regulator; 7= external body (NGO, 
professional body); 8= through grievance procedure; 
9= media; 10= other 
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Table 5. Crosstab recipient per perceived change to wrongdoing after first and second attempt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
recipient 
perceived change to wrongdoing after 
first attempt 
perceived change to wrongdoing after 
second attempt 
negative positive n Total % negative positive n Total % 
1 91.7% 8.3% 36 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 4 100.0% 
2 89.1% 10.9% 349 100.0% 86.0% 14.0% 50 100.0% 
3 79.7% 20.3% 153 100.0% 86.7% 13.3% 113 100.0% 
4 100.0% 0.0% 6 100.0% 66.7% 33.3% 3 100.0% 
5 61.9% 38.1% 21 100.0% 69.2% 30.8% 26 100.0% 
6 47.4% 52.6% 19 100.0% 40.6% 59.4% 32 100.0% 
7 35.7% 64.3% 14 100.0% 46.9% 53.1% 32 100.0% 
8 92.3% 7.7% 26 100.0% 87.0% 13.0% 23 100.0% 
9 66.7% 33.3% 3 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 1 100.0% 
10 91.7% 8.3% 12 100.0% 75.0% 25.0% 4 100.0% 
Total 83.9% 16.1% 639 100.0% 75.3% 24.7% 288 100.0% 
Crosstab sig 
X2= 0.000 
8 cells (40%) with count <5 
X2= 0.000 
8 cells (40%) with count <5  
Note perceived 
change to wrong-
doing: 
negative = nothing is done, or low expectations of investigation 
positive = high expectations of investigation, or wrongdoing stopped 
         
Note recipients: 
1= wrongdoer; 2= line manager; 3= higher management; 4= union;    5= spe-
cialist channel (audit, compliance, HR); 6= regulator; 7= external body (NGO, 
professional body); 8= through grievance procedure; 9= media; 10= other 
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Table 6. Crosstab perceived changes to wrongdoing per attempt (regulator and external bodies) 
 
recipient attempt n 
perceived change to wrongdoing (%) 
Total nothing is 
done 
investigating 
(low expect) 
investigating 
(high expect) 
stopped 
regulator 1 19 42.1 5.3 52.6 - 100.0% 
2 32 31.3 9.4 53.1 6.3 100.0% 
3 18 27.8 5.6 66.7 - 100.0% 
external 1 14 28.6 7.1 50.0 14.3 100.0% 
2 32 34.4 12.5 46.9 6.3 100.0% 
3 11 45.5 9.1 36.4 9.1 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Crosstab formal whistleblower power per retaliation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
formal whistle-
blower power 
n 
retaliation 
Total 
1 2 3 
unskilled 39 5.1% 71.8% 23.1% 100.0% 
skilled 93 8.6% 63.4% 28.0% 100.0% 
admin 23 8.7% 60.9% 30.4% 100.0% 
professional 104 5.8% 66.3% 27.9% 100.0% 
manager 65 3.1% 61.5% 35.4% 100.0% 
executive 7 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 100.0% 
Total 331 6.9% 64.0% 29.0% 100.0% 
X2= 0.045 
6 cells (33.3%) with count <5    
      
Note retaliation:  1= support 
2= informal reprisals, blocking resources, or formal 
reprisal 
3= dismissed 
  
  
 
